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Summary
Recombinant DNA technology has great potential to enhance and extend the advantages of conventional plant breeding,
and increase the production and productivity of crops to meet the increasing demand for food and food products in the
future. Judicious application of this technology provides opportunities for alleviating some of the major constraints to crop
productivity under subsistence farming conditions in the developing countries. Considerable progress has been made in
developing strategies for the production and deployment of transgenic crops. However, biosafety concerns have been raised
regarding the deployment and release of genetically engineered plants. This debate has divided the farming and consumer
communities over acceptability of genetically modified foods. There is a need for a thorough investigation regarding the fate
of transgenic plants in the environment, and their interaction with wild relatives and non-target organisms. The production
and release of transgenic plants should be based on experience and sound scientific reasoning. The regulatory requirements
for deployment of transgenic crops should be streamlined and harmonized, in order to achieve sustainable food production,
poverty reduction, and environmental protection in resource-poor countries in the semi-arid tropics.
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Introduction
Impressive gains in crop productivity were realized in the 20th
century through conventional plant breeding, combined with
improved agricultural practices (Borlaug, 1983). However, with
ever-increasing human and livestock population pressure, conven-
tional plant breeding is constrained either due to the limited gene
pool or because of the restricted range of organisms between which
genes can be transferred due to interspecific barriers. There is
limited scope for increasing the amount of land available for
agriculture without having a serious impact on the environment. New
biotechniques, in addition to conventional plant breeding, are
needed to boost yields of crops that feed the world (Borlaug, 1997).
Genetic transformation provides a complementary means for the
betterment of field crops. Application of biotechnological tools holds
great promise for alleviating some of the major constraints to crop
productivity in developing countries (Sharma and Ortiz, 2000).
Research on transgenic crops, as is the case with conventional plant
breeding, aims to alter selectively by adding or removing a character
of choice in a crop plant, bearing in mind the regional needs and
opportunities. However, the promise of biotechnology for increasing
the production and productivity of crops for sustainability has been
dimmed by the perceived safety of the transgenic organisms
(Williamson et al., 1990). There is also a concern regarding
evolution of resistant strains of insects (Miller and Flamm, 1993). In
developed countries, social and environmental groups have raised
concerns about the real or conjectural effects on non-target
organisms, while in developing countries, the caution has given rise
to fear because of lack of information. In response to these concerns,
a biosafety working group has been formed by the Food and
Agricultural Organization (FAO), the United Nations Environment
Program (UNEP), the United Nations Industrial Development
Organization (UNIDO), and the World Health Organization (WHO);
and guidelines for handling and release of genetically modified
organisms (GMOs) have been published (Tzotzos, 1995). In
developed countries, biotechnology is seen to be of strategic
importance for increasing the share of world market. However, there
are serious concerns about the introduction of this technology in
developing countries. Investment in research is linked to innovation,
timely product development, and commercialization. Delays and
controls arising because of biosafety concerns may become a major
disincentive for investment in biotechnology.
GMOs have a better predictability of gene expression than
conventional breeding methods, and transgenes are not conceptually
different from the use of native genes or organisms modified by
conventional technologies. The focus of biosafety regulations needs
to be on safety, quality, and efficacy (Levin, 1988; Wyngaarden,
1990). The need and extent of safety evaluation may be based on the
comparison of the new food and the analogous food, if any. Further,
the interaction of the transgene with the environment needs to be
investigated. The potential of recombinant technologies that allow a
greater modification than is possible with the conventional
technologies has a greater bearing on the environment. In several
developing countries, there is no system in place to regulate the
production and use of GMOs. The management, interpretation, and
utilization of information will be an important component of risk
assessment, and will determine the effectiveness and reliability of
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this technology. This needs to be transparent with standardized
databases and protocols.
Recent Developments in Transgenic Research
Significant progress has been made over the past decades in
introducing foreign genes into plants, and has provided opportu-
nities to modify crops to increase yields, impart resistance to biotic
and abiotic stresses, and improve nutritional quality. Several
procedures have been successfully employed to insert foreign genes
into crop plants (Potrykus, 1990; Hooykaas and Schilperoort, 1992;
Kung and Wu, 1993; Zupan and Zambryski, 1995; Sharma and
Ortiz, 2000). Although transgenic approaches have considerably
broadened the range of gene pools, which are now accessible for crop
improvement purposes (Flavell, 1999), there are several problems in
the development of plant transformation systems that need to be
solved. The key issues to be resolved in the practical application of
these systems, and strategies by which these limitations may be
overcome, have been discussed extensively by Birch (1997). The
application of useful gene transfer from microorganisms through
genetic engineering techniques ranges from introduction of vaccine
antigen genes (Mason et al., 1996; Arakawa et al., 1998) to
aluminum tolerance genes (de la Fuente et al., 1997) into food
plants. Isolated plant genes such as those conferring resistance
against insect pests and pathogens can now be transferred between
sexually incompatible species (Whitham et al., 1996; Molvig et al.,
1997; Wilkinson et al., 1997).
Despite significant advances over the past decade, the
development of efficient transformation methods to introduce foreign
DNA can be a substantial barrier to the application of recombinant
methods in some crop plants (Sharma and Ortiz, 2000). For genetic
transformation to be successful for routine generation of transgenic
plants, several key factors play an important role. These include the
development of reliable tissue culture and plant regeneration
systems, preparation of gene constructs and transformation with
suitable vectors, efficient techniques of transformation for the
introduction of genes into the crop plants, recovery and
multiplication of transgenic plants, molecular and genetic
characterization of transgenic plants for stable and efficient gene
expression, transfer of genes into elite cultivars by conventional
plant breeding methods if required, and evaluation of transgenic
plants for their effectiveness in alleviating biotic and abiotic stresses
without causing environmental risks. The flow diagram presented in
Fig. 1 describes the integration of transgenic technology with
conventional plant breeding to accomplish transgenic genetic
enhancement in crop plants. While traditional plant breeding is
generally considered safe, the inclusion of transgenes needs to be
assessed for its biosafety. The various components of biosafety and
means to accomplish this in an environment friendly manner are
discussed in the following sections.
Application of Transgenic Technology for Crop
Improvement in Developing Countries
Demand for food is influenced by a number of factors, including
population growth and movement, income levels and economic
growth, human resource development, lifestyles, and food
preferences. Almost 80 million people are likely to be added to
the world’s population each year over the next quarter-century,
increasing the world population by 35% from 5.69 billion in 1995 to
7.67 billion by 2020 (UN, 1996). Most of this increase will occur in
developing countries, and there will be many more mouths to feed
under complex social and economical circumstances. Agricultural
transformation will be essential to meet the global challenges for
reducing poverty, feeding the world’s burgeoning population, and
protecting the environment (Serageldin, 2000). Nobel laureate
Norman Borlaug, father of the Green Revolution, has indicated that
‘to meet projected food demands by 2025 the average yield of all
cereals must be 80 percent higher than the average yield in 1990’
(Borlaug, 1997). These increases must come primarily from
increasing biological yield, and not from area expansion and more
irrigation. Over-consumption and waste in rich countries and
population pressure in poor countries have already placed a
dangerous burden on the ecosystems on which we all depend. It is
estimated that some 40 000 people die every day worldwide from
hunger-related causes (Serageldin, 2000).
Resource-poor farmers are unlikely to have easy access to finance
and agricultural inputs such as pesticides, fertilizers or irrigation.
The low productivity under subsistence farming tends to perpetuate
rural poverty to the extent that approximately 1 billion people live
below the poverty line in developing countries; this includes 633
million in Asia, 204 million in Africa, 27 million in the Near East
and North Africa, and 76 million in Latin America (Jazairy et al.,
1992). However, the small-scale resource-poor farming sector is
FIG. 1. Flow diagram showing the integration of transformation
technology with conventional plant breeding.
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responsible for 80% of agricultural production in developing
countries and therefore is the key to future food security. There are
many socioeconomic factors underlying rural poverty, such as lack of
access to land and other resources, low purchasing power, political
powerlessness, fragile environments, and peripherality from markets
(Spillane, 2000). Research in agricultural biotechnology could have
a major impact on rural poverty. Over the long term, there is little
doubt that some biotechnological approaches to improvements in
agriculture will generate social, economic, and environmental
benefits targeted at specific needs, especially those of poorer groups
(Spillane, 2000). The revolution in the biological sciences such as
molecular genetics, informatics, genomics, and transgenics has
opened up a host of possibilities. The promise of biotechnology as an
instrument of development lies in its capacity to improve the
quantity and quality of plants quickly and effectively. In the past few
years, there have been continuing increases in the area planted to
transgenic crops. In 1998, the global area planted to transgenic
crops more than doubled over that of 1997. However, the revolution
in the biological sciences has both promise and problems. Human
beings are confronted by profound ethical and safety issues,
complicated by the issues of proprietary science. Many protests have
been made by civil society institutions on ethical or ecological
grounds. These concerns cannot and must not be ignored.
According to the Consultative Group on Agricultural Research
(CGIAR), the critical issue is that every instrument of agricultural
transformation should be mobilized in our efforts to feed the hungry,
help the poor, and protect the environment (Serageldin, 2000). The
ethical dimension of depriving the poor and hungry of the advantages
that biotechnology with adequate safeguards can bring must be
weighed against the economic returns. Both sets of issues need to be
confronted boldly by finding ways of realizing the promise of
biotechnology while avoiding the possible pitfalls. If agricultural
biotechnology is to help address problems of rural poverty and
malnutrition, it will have to intentionally shift its focus from crops
that feed chickens, to the staple crops that feed poorer people; from
meeting the needs of large, low-employment farms to the needs of
smallholders and farm laborers (Lipton, 1999). Hence, it will be
necessary for relevant public sector institutions to clearly identify
which of the farmers’ or consumers’ needs are of concern to their
research or funding agenda. Poor people should be included directly
in the debate and decision-making about the technological change,
the possible risks of the change, and the consequences of no change
or the available alternatives.
Biosafety Considerations
For genetically improved organisms, the risks classified as
inherent in the technology are frequently summarized as biosafety
risks. Biosafety assessment requires that risks, benefits, and needs
be given a balanced assessment in relation to the transgenic
organisms. In 1998, over 40 million acres of transgenic crops were
grown around the globe. As these products are traded and pass from
one country to another, it is important to ensure that domestic
regulatory regimes are in place to ensure the safe use of these
products. Currently, the biosafety regulations do exist in several
countries, but there is a need to make them consistent across the
globe. The primary principle of biological safety (i.e., biosafety) is
containment. The term containment refers to a series of safe methods
for managing infectious agents in the laboratory. The purpose of
containment is to reduce or eliminate human and environmental
exposure to potentially harmful or undesired agents. Much
controversy and public scaremongering has been generated by the
anti-biotechnology lobby over the safety of transgenic plants in
relation to their perceived negative impact on human health or the
environment.
Various approaches addressing the risks are concerned with
establishing good standards of laboratory practice, efficiency and
security of the containment facilities, and effects of modified
organisms on human health and the environment (Levin and Strauss,
1993). The risk is assessed in the form of access: as a measure of the
probability that a modified organism (or the DNA inserted in it) will
be able to enter the human body and survive there; and the
anticipated or known level of expression of the inserted DNA. Risk
also measures damage in the form of harm likely to be caused to a
person by exposure to the modified organism.
Environmental hazards posed by a modified organism may include
tendency of a self-pollinated line to outcross because of self-
incompatibility or any other factors. A plant may have a tendency to
become a weed, produce toxic substances in the product or there
may be changes in the toxins produced by the plant. Any of these
attributes may pose a risk to people consuming the product, working
directly with it or to the environment. In the case of pesticidal toxin
genes inserted into the plants, the range of the expressed toxin may
be much wider than expected, with adverse consequences for the
environment. Plants may also display a change in morphology,
reaction to other biotic and abiotic stress factors, or the end-use
characteristics. However, it is not easy to measure weediness, as
such characteristics are not easily defined. The ecological
consequences in most cases are only qualitative. Therefore, risk
assessment for genetically modified plants requires a detailed
assessment of the modified plant in comparison to the plant from
which it has been derived. The assessment should include complete
information about the donor and the receiving species. The receiving
plant species forms the baseline with which the transgenic plant
should be compared. Information is also needed about the gene
donor species, the vector used in transformation, and the antibiotic
or herbicide resistance genes used as a marker. Finally, there should
be complete information about the transgenic plant, molecular data
on the genes inserted, stability of expression, changes in
allergenicity, toxicity, persistence in particular environmental
conditions, and ability to invade new habitats. The changes in the
transformant should be measured against the unmodified control
genotype. The procedures adopted should take cognizance of the
environment where the plant is to be released.
Some of the major considerations for managing and minimizing
(Anonymous, 1998) the perceived risks are as follows:
Containment laboratory facilities. There are two levels of
biological containment, namely primary and secondary. Primary
containment protects people and the immediate laboratory
environment from exposure to infectious agents. Good microbial
techniques and safety equipment can provide sufficient levels of
primary containment. Examples of primary barriers include safety
equipment such as biological safety cabinets, enclosed containers,
and safety centrifuge cups. When it is impractical to work in
biological safety cabinets, personal protective equipment such as
laboratory coats and gloves can act as the primary barrier between
personnel and infectious materials. Secondary containment protects
the environment external to the laboratory from exposure to
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infectious materials. Good facility design and operational practices
provide secondary containment. Examples of secondary barriers
include work areas that are separate from public areas,
decontamination facilities, hand-washing facilities, special
ventilation systems, and airlocks.
The three key elements of biological containment include
laboratory practices, safety equipment, and facility design. To
ensure minimal exposure, the workers must assess the hazards
associated with their work and determine how to apply the biosafety
principles appropriately. The basic laboratory encompasses all
laboratories working with Risk Group I and Risk Group II agents,
including those that present low or moderate risk to the laboratory
worker and low or limited risk to the community (Anonymous, 1998).
Besides following good laboratory practices (GLP), specific practices
need to be followed for handling recombinant DNA materials and it
is the institutional responsibility to adhere strictly to the code of
practice. Emergency procedures to deal with any eventuality that
may arise at the institution engaged in recombinant DNA work must
be in place.
Containment glasshouse facilities. Care needs to be taken that
pollen and seed of transgenic plants from the containment
glasshouse facilities do not escape to the outside. The plants should
be labeled properly. There should be no mixing between the
transgenic plants. There is a need for high levels of quality control
over the DNA sequences, gene constructs, transgenic plants, and the
experimental results. Growing the plants in the greenhouse involves
the same level of controls as in the laboratory. The greenhouse
should be properly designed to keep out insects and pollen. The
facilities should be run under the control of a biosafety committee,
and the level of containment should depend on the type of transgenic
plants. The greenhouses should have a controlled and filtered airflow
system, control of water outlets and sterilization. Autoclaving of
plant and soil material coming out of the greenhouse is very important.
Accordingly, the guidelines for microbiological and biomedical
laboratories suggests four biosafety levels in an incremental order
depending on the nature of the work. These biosafety levels for work
with recombinant DNA techniques take into consideration the source
of the donor DNA and its disease-producing potential. These four
levels correspond to P1 , P2 , P3 , P4 facilities that approximate
to four risk groups assigned for etiological agents (Anonymous, 1998).
Unless determined otherwise by the Institute Biosafety Committee
(IBSC), for most of the experiments dealing with transgenic plants, a
P2 level of containment is recommended.
Contained field trials. A comprehensive risk assessment is
necessary once a plant has to be released for small-scale
experiments, and eventually commercial production. At this stage,
the scientists concerned, the biosafety committee, and the national
or international regulatory authorities should determine whether it is
acceptable to release the specific transgenic plants, and if needed,
the restrictions to be imposed. Field containment should be in place
to limit the possible environmental impact of the release experiment.
This may include (according to the species and plant characteristic)
isolation from the sexually compatible species, prevention of
flowering, use of male-sterile lines, and subsequent monitoring
protocols. Data required for risk assessment includes: (i) general
information, (ii) DNA donor, the receiving species, and the
transgenic plant, (iii) environment and the conditions of release,
(iv) transgenic plant–environment interactions, and (v) control,
monitoring, and waste treatment.
Before going into open field trials, it is necessary to generate
safety information in a contained environment. Such an environment
could be created in a glasshouse, polyhouse, or screenhouse where
conditions can be created to regulate light, humidity, air flow,
temperature, and effective barriers for preventing the entry of
microbial organisms or insects, and efficient trapping of the pollen
grains and biological materials. In order to enable the regulatory
authorities to take a view about the proper assessment of risks and
hazards from the use of transgenic plants before permitting their
large-scale release, information on the above-mentioned aspects is
required to be compiled in a standard format.
Human health. Since some of the transgenes code for proteins
that ordinarily may not be present in the particular host plants, there
is concern about the potential allergenicity or toxicity of these new
varieties to both human and livestock health (Kessler et al., 1992;
Lehrer et al., 1996). An adverse reaction to a food is viewed as a
clinically abnormal response attributed to exposure to that food or
food additive, and includes both immunological and non-
immunological reactions (Sampson and Metcalfe, 1991). Theoreti-
cally, all types of foods can cause allergic reactions. However, it is
difficult to estimate precisely the prevalence of food allergies. In
general, food proteins that maintain their immunogenicity following
processing, cooking, and digestion, while remaining soluble and
absorbable through the intestinal tract, are more likely to elicit an
allergic response rather than those that are not as resistant to such
processes (Lehrer et al., 1996; Taylor and Lehrer, 1996). When
evaluating the potential effects of newly developed food products as
a result of biotechnology, two issues must be considered: first, effects
of the transfer of known protein allergens into new foods, and second,
effects of transfer of recombinant proteins of unknown allergenic
activity into new foods (Kessler et al., 1992; Lehrer et al., 1996).
Several traditional detection methods have been proposed to
detect recombinant allergens in transgenic foods (Lehrer and Reese,
1997). These include in vitro assays such as Western blotting,
radioallergosorbent test (RAST) inhibition, and enzyme-linked
immunosorbent assay (ELISA). These methods are well established,
specific, sensitive, and reproducible, and have been used effectively
to investigate recombinant food proteins in the assessment of
transgenic food products for their potential allergenicity. Burks and
Fuchs (1995) investigated transgenic soybeans in which a gene was
introduced to confer tolerance to glyphosate, the active ingredient in
the herbicide Round-upe. The extracts of different wild-type and
transgenic varieties were analyzed by Western blot for allergenic
proteins through immunoglobulin E (IgE) binding. There appeared to
be no increased binding activity of IgE antibodies from a serum pool
of soy-allergic individuals to the transgenic soybean extracts as
compared to the wild type. In a separate study, an allergen was
detected in a transgenic soybean. The donor gene originated from
Brazil nuts and was expressed in soybeans to increase their
methionine content (Nordlee et al., 1996). It bound IgE from Brazil
nut-sensitive individuals, and was identified as a major Brazil nut
allergen. This demonstrated the possibility of testing new products
for allergens when proteins are transferred from sources that contain
known allergenic material.
Environmental considerations. Modern agriculture is intrinsi-
cally destructive of the environment, particularly of biological
diversity when practiced in a very resource-inefficient way or when it
applies technologies that are not adapted to the ecosystem in a
particular region. The widespread application of conventional
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agricultural technologies such as herbicides, pesticides, fertilizers,
and tillage has resulted in severe environmental damage in many
parts of the world. Thus, according to a working group consisting of
members from the National Academy of Sciences, USA (NAS) of
both the industrialized and developing world, the environmental
risks of new genetically modified technologies need to be considered
in the light of the risks of continuing to use conventional
technologies and other commonly used farming techniques
(Anonymous, 2000). Most of the environmental concerns about
biotechnology in plants have derived from the possibility of gene
flow to the close relatives of transgenic plants, the possible
undesirable effects of the exotic genes or traits (e.g., insect
resistance or herbicide tolerance), and effects on the non-target
organisms.
It is important to describe the invasiveness of transgenic plants in
the wild habitat, their ability to propagate sexually or asexually, the
possibility of transferring transgenes to the same or related species
and to microorganisms, and the consequences of gene transfer. The
risk to the target environment requires qualitative judgement, and
should be based on a case by case study, depending on the
accumulated experience. Information about the purpose of the
release, size, design, and agronomic requirements is important for
risk assessment at the national and international level. Ecological
information about the release site, survey of plant species growing in
the target region, and the nature of pollen dissemination are
important. The anticipated target and non-target organisms with
which the transgenic plant will interact need to be noted.
Information should also be recorded whether the transgenic plant
would become a better or worse host for receiving genes from related
species. The risk to the environment includes harmful effects on the
beneficial non-target organisms.
Once the transgenic plants are released for commercial
cultivation, measures such as prevention of flower production, and
destroying all plant parts is not possible. Therefore, the risk
assessment should also take into account pollen transfer between the
non-transgenic crop and wild relatives. There may also be
possibilities for taking the transgenic plants into areas where the
sexually compatible wild relatives of the crop are present in large
numbers. Transgene instability may also be another cause of concern
when the transgenic crops are grown on a large scale. Strategies for
introducing herbicide resistance into several crops or different
toxins against the prevalent pests and diseases have to be properly
devised. Similarly, options for containment after large-scale
cultivation of a transgenic plant are limited. Therefore, risk
assessment must take these factors into account, and consider all
factors available from small-scale experiments. To overcome such
problems, it may be useful to use tissue-specific expression (target
site for insect feeding or infection by the pathogen, or use of male-
sterile lines to limit the dispersal of pollen, as is the case with
hybrids produced by conventional plant breeding). Another
possibility is growing the transgenic crops where there are no wild
relatives of the crop, and in areas free from non-transgenic crop. The
license for cultivation may be canceled if the results of growing a
transgenic crop are unsatisfactory or there is a risk to human health
and the environment.
The recommendations from a working group that included policy
makers and scientists from six countries, under the auspices of the
NAS (Anonymous, 2000), have suggested that, as with the
development of any new technology, a careful approach is warranted
before the development and deployment of a commercial product.
Further, it must be shown that the potential impact of a transgenic
plant has been carefully analyzed and that, if it is neutral or
innocuous, it is preferable to the impact of the conventional
agricultural technologies that it is designed to replace (May, 1999).
Solutions to Manage the Potential Risks Associated with
Genetically Modified Plants
The behavior of a transgenic plant in the open environment cannot
be predicted in a generalized way. The main concerns are therefore
the right assessment of the magnitude of the consequences from the
use of genetically modified plants to the habitat including humans
and other animals, flora and fauna, and the environment. At present,
there does not seem to be any mechanism for formal or informal
consultations with the different interest groups of the society for
arriving at a consensus on the introduction of transgenics in
agriculture. More social interaction involving stakeholders can be a
step in the right direction for quicker acceptance of GMOs.
Promoting greater participation of organizations who actually
represent the needs of farmers and consumers should be an integral
part of biosafety risk assessment procedures (Spillane, 2000).
Society must have a large number of knowledgeable people, who are
able to understand and appreciate different aspects of this
technology, thus necessitating incorporation of appropriate public
awareness programs into the educational system for developing the
needed manpower. Some of the areas for special attention are as
follows:
Public perceptions. Public perception is likely to have a great
impact on innovation, introduction, and diffusion of products of
biotechnology. A negative public perception is likely to keep the
technology or product away from reaching the market place of its
utilization. Public perception is influenced by a broad range of
issues, including human and environmental safety, ethics, legal
repercussions, economic gains, and socioeconomic impact. The
impact of public perception on biotechnology cannot be gauged
purely on scientific grounds, as public opinion can be influenced by
non-scientific considerations based on impressions created by the
media and pressure groups. Concerns about recombinant technology
were raised in the early 1970s (Leopold, 1993). This led to protests
over the setting up of biotechnology laboratories in developed
countries. Subsequently, more and more organizations entered the
public debate. As a result, regulations and guidelines for handling
DNA-based technologies have been formulated in several developed
and developing countries.
In the late 1980s, the research in biotechnology underwent
several changes, and the main thrust of the technology shifted from
laboratories to the commercial market, and biotechnology was seen
as a critical technology for international competition. Applications
included biomedicine and agriculture, and the potential risks
related to accidentally engineered organisms to health and safety
were raised. With increasing stakes for economic gains and potential
risks, public debate over the need to develop regulatory mechanisms
became more important. This also led to intense public debate
amongst scientists, particularly between molecular geneticists and
ecologists. As a result, the politicians, the industry, and
environmental groups began to take a more active stance. Much of
this debate is likely to play itself out in the regulatory arena, with the
shift of focus from the laboratory to commercial applications. This
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role needs to be taken up by the international and national
agriculture, forest, health, food, and environmental regulatory
authorities.
In a study on public perceptions of agricultural and environmental
biotechnology applications, including commercialization of trans-
genic crops, two different subsets of issues have emerged (Hagedorn
and Allender-Hagedorn, 1997, 1998). Twenty-four issues were
identified under eight categories. However, the frequency scores
from scientific and public sources were different for 14 of the 24
issues. Those appearing most frequently in public sources (popular
press, newspapers, surveys) included: health and ethical issues
associated with transgenic animals, nutrition, value and labeling of
transgenic foods, ethical considerations in creating biotechnology
products, public safety and input into the regulatory process,
decisions on the use and availability of biotechnology products, and
the impact of biotechnology education (e.g., television and the
press). In contrast, those issues appearing most frequently in
scientific sources (technical/regulatory) included: risks and
environmental impact of transgenic microbes, gene transfer in
transgenic plants, patenting and freedom of information, regulatory
structure and risk assessment process, and safety and product
availability in foreign countries. This study identified five issues as
being problematic and involving potential risks: herbicide resistance
in target plants, pest resistance to transgenic plants, weediness and
gene transfer, environmental concerns, and impact on agriculture
and farming. The authors concluded that these five issues represent
the best candidates for developing educational materials directed at
improving public understanding of transgenics.
In general, the scientific community and the public agree that the
risks of genetic engineering are largely exaggerated, but there is a
need for a strict regulatory mechanism. Generally speaking, the
farmers and the public believe that biotechnology will lead to
increased food production and improved nutrition. The level of
education, religion, socioeconomic factors, pressure by the non-
governmental organization (NGO) environmental groups, and
governmental policy are likely to shape public opinion about
biotechnology. Scientific literacy, scientific proof of the non-
sustainance of presumed risks, informal dissemination of infor-
mation through the public media, clear standards, food labeling,
reducing the extent of exaggerated expectations, allowing the public
to be part of the decision-making process, and reliability of
information are important to have a clear picture of the benefits and
risks of biotechnology. Public learning is influenced by economic
conditions, education, social and institutional means of partici-
pation, traditions, cultural and religious values, and historical
background.
In developing countries, there is a need for an environment that is
institutionally, socially, culturally, politically, and educationally
favorable. Developing countries that are adopting biotechnology
tools also have a large proportion of the population capable of
making rational decisions. If large sections of the population are
under the poverty line and illiterate, the NGOs often become the
advocates of public opinion, which at times may be guided by several
extraneous factors. In such a situation, the UN (through FAO, WHO,
and UNIDO) or international agriculture research centers such as
those of the CGIAR are expected to play an important role in
enhancing the public perception of the usefulness and the risks
associated with the introduction of GMOs into the agricultural
systems, the food chain, human health and the environment.
According to Spillane (2000), assessment of the immediate needs of
different groups of farmers and consumers should become an integral
component of biosafety risk assessment procedures, where costs and
benefits could be seen on social rather than solely on environmental
terms exported from countries where food surpluses are a common
phenomenon.
Potential risks of genetically modified plants. Of the ‘risks’ that
have been associated with plant-based agriculture, virtually all are
the consequence of the management practices needed to grow crop
plants and keep them healthy (Cook, 2000). Some of the important
environmental risks associated with the growing of crops include soil
erosion because of tillage used to form the seedbed and weed control,
nitrates left unused in the soil because of over-fertilization (or under-
utilization because of disease), non-target effects of pesticides on
beneficial insects, and smoke from burning the crop residue. Genetic
modification of crop plants has been suggested to be the best route to
mitigate some of these risks, but must be accomplished without
introducing new risks (Cook, 2000). In spite of the safety record,
there is public concern worldwide that plants with genes introduced
from outside their normal range of sexual compatibility (genetically
improved plants) might present new risks to the environment and
human health. Hence, besides exploring the potential benefits of
genetic modification for sustainable agriculture, the potential and
perceived risks associated with growing transgenic plants must be
examined carefully.
The Ecological Society of America (ESA) produced a document
with the objective of providing rigorous support for the development
of a biosafety policy to encourage innovation without compromising
the adequate and safe management of the environment. In this
document, six types of evolutionary and environmental concerns
related to the potential risks of the new biotechnology methods to the
environment and to biodiversity have been listed (Tiedje et al.,
1989). These potential risks include: the creation of new weeds, the
amplification of existing weeds, damage to non-target species, the
perturbation of biotic communities, adverse effects on ecosystem
processes, and waste of precious biological resources. While the
vertical movement of genes within the species or genera need to be
adequately addressed in risk assessment studies, the lateral or
horizontal gene transfer, i.e., non-sexual transfer of genetic
information between genomes, although rare, is possible. Numerous
claims for the lateral transfer of genomic sequences have been made
during the past two decades (Kidwell, 1993). Almost all of the well-
documented cases of gene transfer within eucaryotes seem to involve
mobile elements in chromosomes or other parasitic sequences.
Although it is very difficult, and often impossible, to prove
conclusively that lateral transfer has occurred in any particular
instance, improved methods for detecting such phenomenon are
forthcoming. For example, rapid methods of DNA sequencing at low
cost can reveal sequence variations that are not consistent with
species phylogenies. Hence, there is an urgent need not only to
generate reliable information on natural vertical gene transfer, but
also horizontal exchange of genomes in all plants including
transgenics to address the biodiversity concerns.
Considerations for risk management. Studies conducted by the
NAS (1987, 1989) on the safety of GMOs have concluded that ‘crops
modified by molecular and cellular methods should pose risks no
different from those created by classical genetic methods for similar
traits’. Although claims such as those mentioned above are not
supported by science, some of them might turn out to be true in
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certain circumstances. Hence, governments, research organizations,
and companies must respond to these concerns, and must have in
place the means to scientifically assess the report on real risks
presented by the crop plants. The focus should be on the product and
not the process, and hence, the steps used to conduct a risk
assessment should be the same for all crop plants, regardless of the
source of genes or methods used to transfer these genes (Cook,
2000). Furthermore, whether the risk assessment is done by a
government regulatory agency, an institutional biosafety committee,
or private organization, the assessment process as well as the
conclusions on safety should be in the public domain.
Genetically improved foods are not intrinsically good or bad for
human health. Their health effects depend on their specific content.
Hence, the risks and opportunities associated with genetically
improved foods should be integrated into the general food safety
regulations of a country. The regulatory systems of a country are
needed to govern food safety and assess any environmental risks,
monitor compliance, and enforce such regulations. The regulatory
arrangements should be country-specific and reflect relevant risk
factors. As a result of such intervention, the possible commercializa-
tion of soybeans with a Brazil nut gene that also carried with it a
major allergenic domain was avoided. Another intervention may be
the need to label the content for cultural and religious reasons or
simply because the consumers may want to know what their food
contains. While the public sector must design and enforce safety
standards as well as any labeling required to protect the public
from health risks, other labeling might best be left to the private
sector in accordance with consumer demands for knowledge
(Pinstrup-Anderson and Cohen, 2000).
Biosafety Regulations on Genetically Modified Plants
Since biotechnology products are being adopted rapidly around
the world, there is an increasing need to ensure that consistent safety
standards are put in place to protect human health and the
environment from any potentially adverse effects of these products.
There were 864 field trials of genetically modified plants until 1992,
of which 316 had occurred in the USA, 302 in Canada, and 217 in
the European Community (Dale et al., 1993). Genetically modified
plants have been released in over 22 countries. The regulations
governing the use of transgenic plants vary considerably in different
countries. Existing regulations have been applied to the production
and release of genetically modified plants, but may not be adequate
to cover the potential environmental effects.
In the USA, health and safety aspects of genetically engineered
organisms are covered by the Environment Protection Agency, USA
(EPA), the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the
Food and Drug Administration, USA (FDA) (Levin and Strauss,
1993). The laws related to products of gene technology have been
published in the Federal Register in 1986. Guidelines related to the
use of GMOs have also been issued under the Commission of the
European Communities (CEC, 1990a, b). Latin American countries
have plant quarantine and regulation systems to deal with plant
introduction, and these may have to be altered to deal with GMOs
(IAICA, 1991). Permission for the release of a modified organism is
given after risk assessment by the individual countries. Risk
assessment is carried out by the competent authority, based on the
data supplied by the applicant. The competent authority has to give
the decision within a specified period. Legislation in the the USA is
product specific, while in the European Union, it is process specific.
Different countries in the world are adopting approaches related to
these models, depending upon the type of legislation already in
place. In future, when the use of transgenic plants becomes
widespread, the need for harmonizing the standards and procedures
will become very important. In this regard, the initiative of some
countries (Canada, Argentina, and Chile) is noteworthy, and a
Canadian–Latin American Network (CamBioTec) has been devel-
oped to promote safe and effective use of agricultural and
environmental biotechnology (Flint et al., 2000). A meeting of
Kenyan scientists in October 1999 concluded that attempts by anti-
biotechnology lobby groups from the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries to limit the
application of biotechnologies to food surplus-prone OECD
agriculture are having negative spill-over effects regarding any
possibilities that modern agricultural biotechnologies might be
applied to helping the African continent to achieve its long-term
food security objectives (Spillane, 2000).
To date, there are only three international organizations (OECD,
UNIDO, and UNEP) that have, or plan to invest, significant
resources in biosafety information systems. Recent pressures, due to
increasing global trade in these products and the UN Biosafety
protocol, have encouraged cooperation between these organizations.
Some initiatives have already been taken in this direction by OECD
(1992). The OECD Programme on the Harmonization of Regulatory
Oversight in Biotechnology is an initiative designed to ensure that
environmental health and safety aspects are properly evaluated,
while avoiding non-tariff trade barriers to products of biotechnology.
The majority of OECD member countries have (or are developing) a
system of regulatory oversight for the products that are intended for
release into the environment. The program is expected to play a
coordinating role for regulatory departments in member countries.
To encourage information dissemination, an online database
(BioTrack) has been developed and is used to track regular
developments and field trials of transgenic plant products in OECD
member countries.
United Nations organizations such as UNIDO, UNEP, FAO, and
WHO have published a ‘Voluntary code of conduct’ for the release
of organisms into the environment (UNIDO, 1991). UNIDO has
also supported an international Biosafety Information Network and
Advisory Service (BINAS), which helps developing countries in
the setting up of national authorities that are qualified to handle
the release of GMOs. A similar regional initiative, involving
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries, is
currently being considered. There was cooperative development of
BioTrack and BINAS in 1996 that resulted in the construction of a
joint BioTrack/BINAS page (BIOBIN) on the World Wide Web.
This is expected to contribute towards a global information system
related to regulatory issues and harmonization of biosafety
regulations.
The UN Convention on Biological Diversity is the first UNEP
initiative to focus on issues of biotechnology and more specifically
biosafety. The convention, signed in 1992, laid out provision for the
development of a biosafety protocol. In November 1997, the council
of the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) approved a UNEP/GEF
pilot biosafety enabling project that is aimed to provide assistance to
developing countries, and countries with economies in transition, in
formulating national biosafety frameworks for the implementation of
the UNEP International Technical Guidelines for Safety in
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Biotechnology, and the future implementation of any agreements on
biosafety.
Recognizing the need for regulating the use of modern
biotechnology, biosafety issues have become of utmost importance
in India. The Department of Biotechnology (DBT), Ministry of
Science and Technology of the Government of India, formulated and
released Recombinant DNA Guidelines in 1989 under the
Environmental Protection Act in 1986 (Anonymous, 1998; Ghosh
and Ramanaiah, 2000). These guidelines include: (1) genetically
engineered organisms, (2) genetic transformation of green plants and
animals, (3) recombinant DNA (rDNA) technology in vaccine
development, and (4) large-scale production and deliberate/acci-
dental release of organisms, plants, animals, and products derived
by rDNA technology. After the signing of the Convention on
Biodiversity by the world community in 1992, the DBT revised its
earlier guidelines of 1990 to accommodate the safe handling of
GMOs in research applications and technology transfer in 1994.
This includes the large-scale production and deliberate release of
GMOs, plants, animals, and products into the environment. In
accordance, DBT has framed general safety measures to be practiced
in all kinds of experiments involving modern biotechnology.
To implement these guidelines, the Government of India issued
Rules and Procedures (Rules) for handling GMOs and hazardous
organisms through a Gazette Notification No. GSR 1037(E) dated
December 5, 1989 from the Union Ministry of Environment and
Forests that directs the creation of various committees. Currently,
these guidelines are being implemented through three-tier
mechanisms (Ghosh and Ramanaiah, 2000). These include: (1)
Institutional Biosafety Committees (IBSC) to monitor the research
activities at the institutional level. (2) Review Committee on Genetic
Manipulation (RCGM) functioning in the DBT, which presents
research activities in laboratory-based controlled field experiments.
The RCGM also reviews these activities from safety considerations.
(3) The Genetic Engineering Approval Committee (GEAC) of the
Ministry of Environment and Forests that has the authority to permit
large-scale use of GMOs at the commercial level, and open-field
trials of transgenic materials including agricultural crops, industrial
products, or healthcare products.
Realizing the fact that biotechnology safety guidelines would
never be a one-time exercise as the knowledge is ever expanding, the
DBT has set up the recombinant DNA Committee to prepare a
modified draft of guidelines from time to time on the basis of current
scientific information and from the experience gained locally and
outside the country on the use of the new biotechniques in the area of
research, or possible manufacture and applications. Hence, the
reader is advised to refer to the most current guidelines of the DBT in
practice (Anonymous, 1998). In general, the Biosafety Guidelines
deal with the definition of recombinant DNA, classification of
pathogenic microorganisms, containment facilities and their types,
biosafety levels and appropriate conditions, guidelines for
recombinant DNA research activities, large-scale experiments,
release of GMOs to the environment, import and shipment of rDNA
and its products, and quality of biologicals produced by recombinant
DNA technology.
ICRISAT’s Strategy for Biosafety
ICRISAT, which is part of the CGIAR, has recognized the
importance of the application of plant biotechnology techniques in
the genetic enhancement of its mandate crops that feed the poorest of
the poor. It is fully aware of, and recognizes, the importance of
biosafety of food and the environment (Ortiz, 1999). ICRISAT is
committed to the highest international standards of biosafety to
honor the regulatory policies of the host countries. In accordance
with the requirements of the Indian Government, ICRISAT’s
biotechnology research is carried out under the supervision of the
Institute Biosafety Committe (IBSC) that is represented by its own
scientists and nominees of the Department of Biotechnology,
Government of India. In the pursuit of maintaining high standards of
biosafety, ICRISAT has recently commissioned a P2-level contain-
ment facility for the pre-field screening of transgenic plants (Ortiz,
2000) that has been approved by the IBSC. This facility was built to
conform to the highest international standards prescribed for the P2
level of containment. This facility is pollen proof, insect proof,
shatter proof, and has negative pressure conditions. The effluent
treatment plant stops soil-borne and water-borne dispersal and has a
provision to prevent contamination from personnel by decontaminat-
ing clothes and equipment. Excess water after watering is collected
into a sump and then pumped by using level sensors into another
sump located outside the building, to stay for one day before it is
discharged into the drainage system in an automated manner. All the
discarded material leaving the facility is sterilized by autoclaving.
Moreover, the plants grown in the vicinity of the facility are
constantly monitored. The application of transgenic genetic
enhancement would provide new opportunities to help improve the
lives of the poor while conserving the environment, which will show
the ‘Human Face of Science’, of ICRISAT’s research for
development agenda.
Sources of Information on Biosafety on the World Wide Web
For more information about biosafety and associated issues, the











Modern agricultural biotechnology is one of the most promising
developments in modern science. Discussions on transgenic crops
have placed undue stress on risk assessment, while the potential
advantages are relegated to the background. Recombinant DNA
technology provides a powerful tool to transfer genes across wide
taxonomic groups. Used in collaboration with traditional or
conventional breeding methods, it can raise crop productivity,
increase resistance to pests and diseases, develop tolerance to
adverse weather conditions, improve the nutritional value of some
foods, and enhance the durability of products during harvesting or
shipping. With reasonable biosafety regulations, this can be done
with little or no risk to human health and the environment.
Therefore, it may be important to go beyond the considerations of
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immediate impact on the environment, since we all should share the
responsibility for increasing crop production, and conservation of
the environment. The production and release of transgenic plants
should be based on experience. A fast-track process can be adopted
for transgenes and promoters, which are known to give satisfactory
results in other crops and environments. There is a need for
harmonization of release criteria, and a move towards simplified
regulatory mechanisms in the future. The rapid escalation of
increasingly stringent biosafety regulations regarding transgenic
plants or food, in the absence of any scientifically proven generic
risk, is most likely to limit any application of transgenic research to
meeting either sustainable staple food production or poverty
alleviation needs.
It is essential that agricultural biotechnology research be relevant
to the needs of farmers in developing countries, and that the benefits
of that research are transmitted to small-scale farmers and
consumers in those countries at affordable prices. Condemning
biotechnology for its potential risks without considering the
alternative risks of prolonging the human misery caused by hunger,
malnutrition, and infant mortality is unwise and unethical. The
global community must keep its sights set on the goal of assuring
food for all and cannot afford to be philosophical and elitist about
any part of a possible solution, including agricultural biotechnology.
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